Humans generally fear those different to them (i.e. an out-group) in the same way they fear natural predators. But fear pushes us to derogate others, whether they constitute a threat or not. Research has examined how fear associated with specific intergroup relations interferes with how individuals relate to in-group and out-group members. However, we know relatively little about how intergroup relations might be affected by incidental emotions. We tested how incidental fear affects empathy towards in-group and out-group members. We found that exposing participants to fearful imagery was sufficient to reduce empathy, but only in response to out-group suffering. We discuss how these findings provide insight into how fear is often leveraged to encourage social tribalism.
FEAR & INTERGROUP EMPATHY 4 shapes behaviour at an unconscious level. As such, it is important to be cognisant of how fear can bias perception and encourage discrimination of the socially distant. Indeed, we often attribute our fears to the out-group whether they are the source of it or not (Cain, 2012; Hodson et al., 2013 )responding instinctively, as if to a natural predator such as a snake (Navarrete et al., 2012) .
The out-group however is not a homogenous concept; out-groups are not all perceived equally and they elicit discrete emotions. Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2007) described how groups are perceived along dimensions of warmth and competence, eliciting discrete emotions. For example, the elderly and disabled tend to be perceived as warm but incompetent, eliciting pity whereas Asians and Jews are often perceived, in Western societies, as cold but competent, and associated with envy. These perceptions and the emotions they accompany have behavioural consequences: We typically seek to help the pitied and actively harm the envied (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007) . The Intergroup Emotions Theory developed by Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) suggests that such emotional reactions are based on appraisals of the in-group vis-á-vis other groups; in a broad sense, specific patterns of appraisal are related to perceptions and appraisals that reflect specific intergroup relationships and lead to specific emotions. With the above example, Asian and Jews elicit envy not simply because they are competent but because they are more competent than 'us' and could constitute a threat (symbolically, in terms of status positions or realistically, in terms of access to resources). In this case, emotions are often integral to FEAR & INTERGROUP EMPATHY 5 the intergroup context; they are irrevocably tied to the relationship between the in-group, the specific out-group, and what they represent to us.
The Role of Incidental Fear in Intergroup Relations
Though these insights have contributed to a much improved understanding of intergroup relations, the role of incidental emotions in intergroup relationships is a lot less understood. Incidental emotions are emotions or feelings that arise independently from the judgement that needs to be made (e.g., sadness due to a bereavement is incidental to the decision to give up on a work project) (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003) . Integral emotion, on the other hand, is the emotion that is part of the individual's embodied representation of the decision, such as when one experiences frustration about a work project and therefore decides to give up on it (Schwarz & Bohner, 2001) .
Incidental emotions are important because they drive heuristic or 'mental short-cut' judgements (Schwarz, 2012) . Incidental emotions can therefore be considered a source of bias or undesired influence (Vohs, Baumeister, & Loewenstein, 2007) . The more salient the incidental emotion is, the greater the bias will be (Schwarz & Bohner, 2001) . The central assumption for this misattribution is that the affective system cannot distinguish between real (integral) and false (incidental) feelings and thus any experienced emotion is inextricably associated with the present context (Schwarz, 2012) .
There is already some evidence that emotions that are incidental to the intergroup context can subtly influence how we treat others. For example, merely thinking about a time one became angry can produce an automatic bias against an out-group, as if from 'thin-air' (DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, FEAR & INTERGROUP EMPATHY 6 & Cajdric, 2004) . Negative emotions can also exacerbate prejudice towards groups for whom the emotion is stereotypically relevant (e.g. disgust towards homosexuals or anger towards Arabs; Dasgupta, DeSteno, , & Hunsinger, 2009 ). The precise mechanism through which incidental emotions affect intergroup attitudes is not yet fully understood, but research suggests that negative emotions interfere with a number of topdown control processes like attention (Nikolla, Edgar, Catherwood, & Matthews, 2018) or object recognition (Baumann & DeSteno, 2010) .
Williams
Importantly, negative incidental emotions do not necessarily lead to enhanced negativity towards out-groups-they can instead (or in addition) lead to positivity towards in-groups. For example, during the London Bombings, many survivors, though likely scared and distressed, stopped to help each other, driven by a sense of shared fate and psychological grouping (Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 2009 ). Work on the effects of incidental emotions has also shown that fear, for example, can enhance positive attitudes towards the in-group (Bukowski, Dragon, & Kossowska, 2014) . Our focus in this paper is on how incidental fear might affect a specific positive emotion-empathy for another's pain. Others have shown that interacting with an out-group target can evoke anxiety (Mendes, Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002) and this, in turn, has been shown to inhibit empathy.
Indeed, Martin and colleagues (2015) found that for human and non-human (mice) participants, the anxiety from interacting with a stranger correlated negatively with empathic-concern for the other's suffering. Moreover, blocking feelings of anxiety (pharmacologically) or engaging in a collaborative activity together can effectively restore empathy (Martin et al., 2015) . This suggests that To be clear, we do not seek to re-establish the role of emotions in empathy, for which there is already substantial evidence (see e.g., Singer & Klimecki, 2014) . Rather, we are concerned with the role of incidental fear;
that which is not directly evoked by the intergroup context. We seek to investigate whether simply being afraid, for reasons unrelated to the intergroup relationship, is enough to elicit empathic bias. One might argue that we already know that (integral) fear affects intergroup attitudes. However, there is added value in examining whether or not this is also the case with incidental fear. If we find that incidental fear increases intergroup biases, we learn that it is not enough to focus on improving specific intergroup relations to eliminate biases, since these will emerge with the occurrence of seemingly unrelated threats. For example, reading about a terrorist attack can cause fear and anger (Das et al., 2009 ) and those emotions can be misattributed as a genuine reaction to an unrelated target (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) . This phenomenon can explain why, in the UK, attacks of individuals with disabilities, or of LGBT individuals, increased after a series of terrorist attacks (Home Office, 2018). Examining this is likely to advance understanding both of the drivers of intergroup biases and of how emotions operate.
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Overview of the Research
We conducted two studies measuring the extent to which participants felt empathy for their group vs. an out-group, following induction fear vs. a control condition. In Study 1, we induced fear by showing photographs of objects associated with common phobias such as spiders and snakes. In Study 2, we used images of physical threats such as a gun pointed at the screen (eliminating stimuli that also tapped into other negative emotions such as disgust). We developed this novel paradigm, as opposed to employing autobiographical recall (as others have done), due to the need to ensure that participants were exposed to (the same) incidental fear, rather than fear linked to aspects of intergroup relations. This method enabled us to exert greater control over the emotion elicited, and over the conditions in which we were placing our participants, and did not rely on participants' ability, or willingness, to recall experiences with fear.
In both studies, our core measure of interest was participants' empathic responses towards others' suffering. We predicted that inducing fear would lead to increased biases in empathy, compared to control conditions. It was unclear to us whether bias would manifest as increased ratings of empathy for the in-group or decreased empathy for the out-group. For exploratory purposes, we also measured evaluations of the target groups explicitly (selfother overlap and stereotype content) and implicitly (a pictorial Implicit Association Task; IAT). These measures were included to determine the extent to which participants had prior implicit or explicit perceptions about the target groups. Capturing these responses allowed us to determine whether any change in empathy was associated with incidental emotion (i.e. 
Stimuli
The main task has been validated to study intergroup empathy (Richins et al., 2018) . This involved participants viewing photographs of in-group and out-group targets experiencing painful or innocuous events. 1 Participants were instructed only to memorise the target's group membership (i.e. a student from one of the groups), to observe what the target experienced, and then recall the target's group membership in a simple 1-back task (a simple measure of working memory wherein participants are required to remember information from 1 or more turns back; Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2009). A total of 96 trials, 50% depicting painful events (48), and 33% per group (32), each lasting 10 seconds, were presented in a single run. Photos were matched across conditions for dimension and orientation. The targets themselves were matched across conditions for sex, perceived age, race, and attractiveness. The targets demographics reflected the students at the university where the study was conducted, regarding age, sex, and visible race/ethnicity.
The emotion induction procedure involved showing images on-screen, with a rapid onset and completely at random during the task. This was to simulate a 'jump scare' -an abrupt change in image that is often used in horror FEAR & INTERGROUP EMPATHY 11 films or video games to surprise the audience. The participants were told that this would happen and that they were not required to respond to those images;
they were simply to continue responding to the main task. Before commencing participants were reminded of their right to withdraw should they be uncomfortable with any aspect of the study. To induce fear, half of participants were shown images from the Set of Fear Inducing Pictures database (SFIP; Marchewka, Żurawski, Jednoróg, & Grabowska, 2014; Michałowski et al., 2016; Riegel et al., 2016) 2 of objects that are associated with common phobias (e.g. spiders, snakes). As a control, the other participants were shown images of a non-fearful but content-matched object (e.g. a knitted toy spider). These images were sourced from an image hosting Internet service (www.flickr.com) under a Creative Commons license. There were 12 (fearful vs. non-fearful) images in total in the induction procedure. In each trial, there was a 12.5% chance of an image appearing (in either condition). The image would appear with a rapid onset and for a brief duration (1000ms). A new sequence of trials and timings for the main task was randomly generated for each participant.
Following the main task, participants were presented with a pictorial IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) . The images consisted of the targets from the main task with their group membership visibly denoted by a coloured bracelet. The IAT consisted of 4 blocks. For 2 blocks, participants were asked to distinguish between in-group vs. out-group targets followed by fear-(fear, terror, horror, and panic) vs. positive-related words (calm, relax, peace, and rest; Cain, 2012).
For a further 2 blocks, participants were asked to pair in-group targets with positive-related words and out-group targets with fear-related words, followed by the reverse. The order of the latter 2 blocks was counterbalanced.
A new sequence of trials and timings was randomly generated for each participant. Stimuli were presented using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) on an 800x600 LCD monitor.
Measures
Participants To measure empathy, we asked participants to respond to two items, after each event picture: One that gauged self-focused empathy (i.e. "to what extent was the event painful for you to witness?") and one that gauged more other-focused empathy (also designated as compassion, i.e., "to what extent did you feel bad for the target?"). Responses were made on a standard keyboard using a visual analogue scale (1 = not at all to 100 = very much so).
In the final part of the study, participants were asked to complete the inclusion of other in the self scale (IOS; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) Procedure. After providing written consent, participants were allocated to one of two artificial groups (the red or blue group). To do this, we asked participants to complete a bogus personality questionnaire in which they were required to estimate the amount of dots on the screen. The computer then ostensibly analysed responses and placed participants with others according to the similarity of their scores, forming two groups. In reality, allocation was randomised between participants. To ensure that group membership remained salient, participants were given a coloured bracelet reflecting their group's colour.
In the main section of the study, participants were shown pictures of individuals experiencing either physical pain (e.g. receiving an injection) or something innocuous (e.g. being touched by an earbud or Q-tip). In each case, the target individual was from either the same or different group as the participant. The target's group membership was visualised by a coloured box that preceded each trial as well as a coloured bracelet that was either the same or different to the one that the participant was wearing. To ensure that participants would process the target's group membership, we instructed them to memorise it for a simple 1-back task. Once participants had identified the FEAR & INTERGROUP EMPATHY 14 target's group, they were asked how much empathy they felt for the target following the observed event.
At intermittent times during the response phase of the empathy task, an image would appear that was designed to induce fear or not-the condition was set by E-Prime at random with experimenter remaining blind to condition to preclude any possibility of influencing the results(i.e. a randomised, double-blind procedure). In the final section, participants were asked to complete a pictorial IAT followed by IOS scales and a set of group-based evaluations.
Results
For a summary of means, standard deviations, and correlations please refer to Error! Reference source not found. S1. All results are Bonferronicorrected unless otherwise indicated. The dataset for this study can be located at the following OSF project page: DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/AQFS9. Empathy task. To investigate the effects of fear on intergroup, we ran a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with target group as a repeated factor and fear as a between groups factor. We predicted a two-way group*fear interaction on empathy.
There was no main effect of group membership, F (1, 76) = 3.29, p = .073, ηp 2 = .042, no main effect of fear, F (1, 76) = .070, p = .792, ηp 2 = .001, nor any interaction between fear and group membership, F (1, 76) = .129, p = .720, ηp 2 = .002, on self-focused empathy.
Regarding other-focused empathy (i.e. compassion), there was a significant effect of target group, F (1, 76) = 8.00, p = .006, ηp 2 = .095, qualified by a significant interaction between target group and fear, F (1, 76) = 4.52, p = .037, ηp 2 = .056: Whereas those exposed to fearful images reported significantly less other-focused empathy for the out-group compared to in-group, F (1, 76) = 12.59, p = .001, ηp 2 = .142, those exposed to non-fearful images reported equal levels of other-focused empathy for both groups, F (1, 76) = .240, p = .626, ηp 2 = .003 (Table 1) .
Automatic attitudes. D scores were computed using the improved algorithm from Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji, (2003) . The mean of correct latencies was computed for each block as was the difference between blocks.
This was then divided by a pooled standard deviation and finally averaged. The fear manipulation had no effect on automatic attitudes, t (77) = -.939, p = .350, 95% CI [-.88, .32].
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Self-reported overlap. Participants reported more overlap with in-group, compared to out-group, targets, F (1, 76) = 36.08, p < .001, ηp 2 = .322. This was qualified by a significant interaction between group membership and fear, F (1, 76) = 4.20, p = .044, ηp 2 = .052. Participants who were exposed to fearful images reported less overlap with the out-group compared to those exposed to non-fearful images, F (1, 76) = 11.49, p = .001, ηp 2 = .131. In response to the ingroup, however, fear had no effect, F (1, 76) = .075, p = .785, ηp 2 = .001.
Group perceptions. Stereotype content. A 2 (fear) x 2 (group membership) ANOVA revealed there was no main effect of group membership on ratings of competence, F (1, 76) = 2.80, p = .098, ηp 2 = .04. There was a main effect of fear, F (1, 76) = 4.49, p = .037, ηp 2 = .06. Participants exposed to fearful images rated individuals from both groups as less competent, compared to the control group, t (77) = -2.12, p = .037, 95% CI [-15.31, -.48], d = .
48.
There was no interaction between fear and group membership, F (1, 76) = .301, p = .585, ηp 2 = .004.
There was a main effect of group membership on ratings of perceived sociability, F (1, 76) = 17.99, p < .001, ηp 2 = .19. Participants rated the in-group as significantly more sociable than the out-group, t (77) = 4.27, p < .001, 95% CI [5.09, 13.99], d = .46. There was a main effect of fear, F (1, 76) = 5.04, p = .028, ηp 2 = .06: Participants exposed to fearful images rated all targets as less sociable than the control group, t (77) = -2.25, p = .028, 95% CI [-17.11, -1.02], d = .55. There was no interaction between fear and group membership, F (1, 76) = 1.23, p = .271, ηp 2 = .016.
Status.
There was no main effect of group membership on ratings of perceived status, F (1, 76) = .586, p = .446, ηp 2 = .016. There was no main FEAR & INTERGROUP EMPATHY 17 effect of fear, F (1, 76) = .046, p = .831, ηp 2 = .001, nor any interaction between fear and group membership, F (1, 76) = .026, p = .992 ηp 2 = .00.
Similarity and rivalry.
There was no effect of fear on reports of perceived similarity, t (77) = .438, p = .662, 95% CI [-6.93, 10.91], d = .09, nor ratings of a perceived rivalry, t (77) = -1.46, p = .148, 95% CI [-22.63, 3 .47], d = .33.
Discussion
The goal of the current study was to determine whether incidental fear would exacerbate intergroup biases in empathy. The results revealed that fear exerted a functional influence on other-focused empathy (i.e. compassion).
After seeing pictures of spiders and snakes, participants reported lower levels of other-focused empathy for out-group members, compared to in-group members, while in the control group there was no difference in the empathy expressed according to target's group membership. Said another way, intergroup biases in (other-focused) empathy emerged only when participants reported feeling afraid. No parallel effects were found for self-focused empathy.
This difference between self-vs. other-focused empathy is consistent with previous research where we found that the perceived threat of an out-group had greater influence on brain regions typically associated with other-focused empathy, over areas associated with self-focused empathy (Richins et al., 2018 ).
In the current study, we also explored whether explicit or implicit evaluations were similarly affected by fear and potentially explained the effect of fear on empathy. We asked participants to complete an IAT as well as selfreport their relationship to the perceived groups. Previously, researchers have In Study 2, we sought to replicate and extend these findings. We used the same paradigm but eliminated images that may elicit other fear-related emotions (e.g. spiders elicit fear but also disgust; Davey, 1994)-the remaining stimuli consisted of physical threats such as a gun pointed at the screen. The intended effect was to circumscribe the induced emotion more specifically to fear. Procedure. The paradigm was identical to that of Study 1 with the exception that the induction procedure persisted throughout the study, rather than only during the empathy task.
Results
For a summary of the means, standard deviations, and correlations please refer to Table S2 . F (1, 63) = .148, p = .702, ηp 2 = .002, nor a significant interaction between fear and group membership, F (1, 63) = .921, p = .341, ηp 2 = .014.
Participants reported feeling more other-focused empathy (compassion) when the target in pain was an in-group, compared to an out-group member, F
(1, 63) = 9.66, p = .003, ηp 2 = .133. This was qualified by a marginally significant interaction between group membership and fear, F (1, 63) = 3.31, p = .074, ηp 2 = .05: Those in the fear condition reported less other-focuses empathy for an out-group, compared to in-group, target, F (1, 63) = 11.95, p = .001, ηp 2 = .159.
Those in the control condition, however, reported equal levels of other-focused empathy, irrespective of target group membership, F (1, 63) = .843, p = .362, ηp 2 = .013 (Table 1) .
Automatic attitudes.
There was no difference in automatic attitudes between groups, t (64) = -.031, p = .975, 95% CI [-.60, .58].
Self-reported overlap. Participants reported more overlap with in-group, compared to out-group targets, F (1, 63) = 21.10, p < .001, ηp 2 = .251.
Participants in the fear condition reported greater overall overlap with others compared to those in the control group, F (1, 63) = 3.88, p = .053, ηp 2 = .058.
There was no interaction between fear and group membership, F (1, 63) = .428, p = .515, ηp 2 = .007.
Group perceptions. Competence and sociability.
There was no main effect of group membership on perceived competence, F (1, 63) = 2.33, p = .132, ηp 2 = .04. There was also no effect of fear, F (1, 63) = .223, p = .638, ηp 2 = FEAR & INTERGROUP EMPATHY 21
.004, nor any interaction between fear and group membership, F (1, 63) = .078, p = .781, ηp 2 = .001.
There was a main effect of group membership on perceived sociability, F
(1, 63) = 5.12, p = .027, ηp 2 = .08. Participants rated the in-group as significantly more sociable than the out-group, t (64) = 2.26, p = .027, 95% CI [.63, 10.09], d = .31. There was no main effect of fear, F (1, 63) = .035, p = .852, ηp 2 = .001, nor any interaction between fear and group membership, F (1, 63) = .030, p = .863, ηp 2 = .00.
Status.
There was a main effect of group membership on perceived status, F (1, 63) = 10.64, p = .002, ηp 2 = .15. Participants rated the out-group as significantly higher in status than the in-group, t (64) = 3.26, p = .002, 95% CI [8.74, 36.36], d = .81. There was no main effect of fear, F (1, 63) = .001, p = .998, ηp 2 = .000, and no interaction between fear and group membership, F (1, 63) = .065, p = .800 ηp 2 = .001.
Similarity and rivalry.
There was no effect of fear on perceived similarity, t (64) = -1.19, p = .240, 95% CI [-18.99, 4 .84], d = .29, nor on perceived rivalry, t (64) = -.354, p = .724, 95% CI [-18.35, 12.82 
Discussion
The goal of Study 2 was to replicate the finding that fear increases empathic bias. As in Study 1, participants reported less other-focused empathy for out-group, compared to in-group, targets in pain, but only following exposure to fear-inducing images. The interaction between fear and group membership did not pass the conventional threshold for significance in this study, but analyses of the effects across studies confirms the consistency of the results. (For the details please see
Supplementary Materials).
In Study 1, we primed fear by showing objects associated with common phobias such as spiders and snakes. This led participants to increase distance from the out-group. In Study 2, we primed fear by showing physical threats such as a gun pointed at the screen, controlling for other fear-related emotions like disgust. This led participants to draw towards others more generally (i.e. regardless of group membership). We note that we did not measure disgust directly in this study, so our conclusions are drawn in the absence of direct empirical evidence for this specific point. Future research in this area would benefit from measuring a number of relevant negative emotions in order to disentangle responses emerging from fear as opposed to, for example, disgust.
We recognise that the effects on empathy are not of very large magnitude.
However, what is striking is that such brief and simple imagery can influence selfreported empathy at all. Empathy is a highly socially desirable response and, given the opportunity, participants will seek to confirm any presentation of themselves as empathic and compassionate (Decety & Jackson, 2006) , for example, by selfreporting more empathy than they might otherwise feel. For that desire to be affected FEAR & INTERGROUP EMPATHY SUPP MATERIALS by the brief (no longer than a second) exposure to a photograph suggests something greater than we might be able to demonstrate with laboratory data. In order to circumvent the issue of social desirability, future work would benefit from measuring empathic responses that are not within a participant's volitional control, for example with physiological responses, or neural correlates. This would prevent participants from being able to respond strategically, by presenting themselves as more empathetic than they may otherwise be. This is still a relatively understudied area and even with results that are not very strong, we feel this paper lays some groundwork for future researchers to exploit.
Conclusion
Fear drives a wedge in society and reshapes the political landscape-it is often even leveraged with that purpose (Boyd, 2012) . At the Nuremberg Trials, Herman Goering said that to bring people to 'the bidding of leaders' you need only expose them 'to great danger' and tell them 'they are being attacked' (Gilbert, 1995, p.278-279) . It's unsurprising, then, that fear features so prominently in political rhetoric (Gore, 2004) . Indeed, Donald Trump garnered support for his candidacy as President by harnessing economic anxieties (Rothwell & Diego-Rosell, 2016) . Harnessing these fears can provide the traction to pave way for political movements, allowing candidates who stoke ethnic or cultural tensions to mobilise a populace towards right-wing nationalism (Valentino, Hutchings, & White, 2002) .
It is important to recognise how emotions may distort our perception of the world and it is our responsibility to keep our emotions in check. We might not be 'Mini' meta-analysis. To determine whether incidental fear reliably influenced compassion, we ran a 'mini' meta-analysis. 'Mini' metas use the same statistical approach as any meta-analysis but can be run on as few as two datasets.
The goal of a mini-meta is to draw attention towards effect sizes and away from pvalues, highlighting the 'bottom line' of a set of studies within a manuscript (Goh, Hall, & Rosenthal, 2016) . In this analysis, we scrutinised the simple effects of the within-between interaction of incidental fear and group membership across Study 1
and Study 2. Group membership was coded as 0 = in-group and 1 = out-group. Any effect size with a negative value would therefore indicate that the out-group received less compassion than the in-group, and any effect size with positive value would indicate that the out-group received more compassion than the in-group.
To produce a summary effect size for the effect of group membership on selfreported compassion for each study, we calculated Cohen's d using Formula 1 from We then used Formula 5 to create a single weighted mean from the r scores:
Finally, to create a summary Z-score for all of the studies in each analysis we used Stouffer's formula (Mosteller & Bush, 1954) where k refers to the number of independent Z scores being combined:
The results revealed that following exposure to fear-relevant stimuli participants reported significantly less compassion towards an out-group target, compared to an in-group target, whereas in the control condition there was no difference (Table S3 ). Table S1 . Summary of means, standard deviations, and correlations for scores on perceived competence, sociability, status, similarity, and rivalry, self-reported empathy, self-other overlap, and implicit bias score split by the between groups manipulation from Study 1
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